III. Terrorism as Foreign Policy

During the 20th century, states used military forces to pursue policies of aggres­sion, conquest, and cultural or ethnic extermination. In the latter half of the century, especially in the latter quarter, many governments used terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy. As a policy option, state-sponsored terrorism is a logical option because states cannot always deploy conventional armedforces to achieve strategic objectives. As a practical matter for many governments, it is often not logistically, politically, or militarily feasible to confront an adversary directly. For example, few states can hope to be victorious in a conventional mili­tary confrontation with the United States—as Saddam Hussein's well-entrenched Iraqi army learned both in Kuwait during the Gulf War of 1990-1991 and the U.S.-led invasion of March and April 2003. Terrorism thus becomes a relatively acceptable alternative for states pursuing an aggressive foreign policy against a superior adversary.

Governments use terrorism and other confrontational propaganda because from their point of view, it is an efficient way to achieve strategic objectives. As practical matter for aggressive regimes, state terrorism in the international domain is advantageous in several respects:

State terrorism is inexpensive. The costs of patronage and assistance for terror­ist movements are relatively low. Even poor nations can strike and injure a prosperous adversary in a single spectacular incident.

State terrorism has limited consequences. State assisters that are clever can dis­tance themselves from culpability for a terrorist incident. They can cover their involvement, disclaim responsibility, and thus escape possible reprisals or other penalties.

State terrorism can be successful. Weaker states can raise the stakes beyond what a stronger adversary is willing to bear. Aggressor states that wish to remain anonymous can likewise successfully destabilize an adversary in a proxy move­ment. They can do so with one or more spectacular incidents or by assisting in a campaign of terror.

To simplify matters for our discussion, we will discuss the following four policy frameworks. They signify the varied qualities of state-sponsored terrorism in the international domain:

1. Moral support: politically sympathetic

2. Technical support: logistically supportive

3. Selective participation: episode-specific sponsorship

4. Active participation: joint operations supportive sponsorship

Moral Support: Politically Sympathetic Sponsorship

Politically sympathetic sponsorship occurs when agovernment openly embraces the main beliefs and principles of a cause. This embrace can range in scope frompoliticalagreement with a movement's motives, though not its tactics, to complete support for both. Such support may be delivered either overtly or covertly. Althoughpolitically sympathetic governments act as ideological role models for their championed group, such support is often a way for the state topursue its national agenda.

Iran's support for several violent movements in the Middle East is an example of unambiguous policy of mentorship for groups known to have engaged in acts of terrorism. Iran consistently provided politically sympathetic and logistically supportive sponsorship for several movements, including Lebanon's Hezbollah, Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Hamas. All of these organizations adopted religious revolutionary ideologies—including strong anti-Israel goals—-which created a sense of revolutionary common cause among religious hard-liners in Iran.

Technical Support: Logistically Supportive Sponsorship

Logistically supportive sponsorship occurs when a government provides aid and comfortto a championed cause. This can include directly or indirectly facilitating training, arms resupply, safe houses, or other sanctuary for the movement. These options are relatively passive types of support that allow state sponsors of terror­ism to promote an aggressive foreign policy agenda but deny their involvement in terrorist incidents.

An excellent case study is the foreign policy Syria adopted during the rule of Hafez el-Assad. During that time, from February 1971 to June 2000, Syria fought two wars against Israel, strongly backed the Palestinian cause, occupied the Beka'a Valley in Lebanon, and supported the Lebanese militias Amal and Hezbollah. Assad's regime could certainly be aggressive in the international domain, but despite this activism, Syria was rarely linked directly to terrorist incidents. " There is no evidence that either Syria or Syrian government officials have been directly involved in the planning or execution of international terrorist attacks since 1986.

Selective Participation: Episode-Specific Sponsorship

Episode-specific sponsorship refers to government support for a single incident or series of incidents. For this type of operation, the government will provide as much patronage or assistance as is needed. Sometimes members of the proxy will carry out the incident, and at other times agents of the state sponsor will.

One example of episode-specific support was the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, which exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988. Two hun­dred seventy people were killed, all 259 passengers and crew and 11 persons on the ground. In November 1991, the United States and Great Britain named two Libyan nationals as the masterminds of the bombing. The men—Abdel Basset al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa Fhima—were alleged to be agents of Libya's Jamahiriya Security Organization (ISO). This was a significant allegationbecause the JSO was repeatedly implicated in numerous acts of terrorism, including killing political rivals abroad, laying mines in the Red Sea, attacking Western interests in Europe and providing logistical support and training facilities for terrorists from around the world. Libyan leader Muammar el-Qaddafi denied any involvement of Libyan government or its citizens.

Active Participation: Joint Operations

Joint operations are when government personnel carry out campaigns in cooperation with a championed proxy. Close collaboration is typical, with the spot providing primary operational support for the campaign. Joint operations often undertaken during a large-scale and ongoing conflict.

An example is the Phoenix Program, a campaign conducted during Vietnam War to disrupt and eliminate the administrative effectiveness of the Viet Cong, the communist guerrilla movement recruited from among southern Vietnamese. It was a 3-year program that focused on the infrastructure of the Viet Cong.! American and allied South Vietnamese squads were to wage the campaign by pooling intelligence information and making lists of persons to be targeted. The targets were intended to be hard-core communist agents and administrators, and were supposed to be arrested rather than assassinated.

In practice, although the communists were significantly disrupted, many innocent Vietnamese were swept up in the campaign. Also, " despite the fact that the law provided only for the arrest and detention of the suspects, one-third of the “nuetralized agents' were reported dead." Corruption was rampant among Vietnamese officials.

Thus, terrorism and sponsorship for subversive movements are method; statecraft that many types of governments have adopted, from stable democracies to aggressive and revolutionary regimes. It is certainly true that democracies less likely to engage in this behavior than aggressively authoritarian states. However democracies have been known to resort to terrorist methods when operating within certain security or political environments.