Meaning and metalinguistics

7.1. In this chapter, we propose to discuss briefly a charac­teristic trend in modern linguistics. This new trend, metalinguistics, assigns a central role in human cognition to meaning, and draws from the difference of meanings observed in different languages far-reaching conclusions concern­ing the possibility of understanding between peoples. In the following, we shall first summarize the main tenets of metalinguistics, and we shall then make a few critical re­marks on them. We shall also touch on a few questions regarding the relationships between meaning andtrans­lation.

7.2. Metalinguistics is an independent study which has as its task the examination of all interrelations and points of contact which have come into existence between the language and the culture of the people speaking the lan­guage. Metalinguistics thus claims to replace traditional semantics.

This branch of linguistic study arose in America and this can be explained by the fact that in America linguis­tics and ethnography are traditionally in close relationship.

Metalinguistics is a branch of linguistic science claim­ing for itself an independent field of research and possess­ing particular methodological processes which have been expounded in the works of Benjamin Whorf. The attention of scientific opinion, especially that of European linguists, was only drawn to him after the posthumous publication of a collection of his work.

Of these, the Collected Papers on Metalinguistics and Language, Thought and Reality are worth mentioning. Whorf states, among his generalizations, that the theory that all people possess in the cognitive process, a common logical system, which is independent of their native language, is an incorrect one. According to Whorf, language determines how the speaker perceives the outside world and how he judges it. As linguistic patterns vary from one nation to another, the different nations, as a result of the individu­ality of their linguistic system, gain a different view of world. Hence, Whorf states that the linguistic system not only expresses our thoughts but also determines them.

Whorf reached this conclusion after a detailed analysis of a few Indian languages and cultures, especially the Hopi language, and compared his findings with the equivalent stages of development in Indo-European languages. The latter he terms Standard Average European, which he abbreviates to SAE.

It must be pointed out that Whorf’s theory had certain antecedents in America as well as in Europe. In America, it was Sapir who expressed similar thoughts. We quote a paragraph in which the similarity of thought is at once apparent: “The understanding of a simple poem, for instance, involves not merely an understanding of the single words in their average significance, but a full comprehension of the whole life of the community as it is mirrored in thewords or as it is suggested by their overtones... We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do, because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation.” Of the European pioneers of metalinguistics, Humboldt, Cassirer and Weisgerber, must be mentioned as being in the forefront.

After these preliminaries, let us summarize the main thesis of Whorf.

One of the main theses of Whorf is referred to in lit­erature as the principle of linguistic relativity. The indi­vidual, according to Whorf, can never freely comprehend surrounding reality. Even when he feels himself completely free, the linguistic system of his native language limits him to a certain mode of interpretation.

Therefore, we have to introduce the linguistic principle of relativity, which states that not all speakers in the world come to the same conclusion when observing the same outside reality. The users of different grammatical systems make different observations. They judge the similar actions of the outside world in a different way, and, therefore, a different representation of the surrounding reality is created within themselves.

Whorf, like Sapir, adds to this: “We cut and organize the spread and flow of events as we do, largely because, through our mother tongue, we are parties to an agreement to do so, not because nature itself is segmented in exactly that way for all to see.”

In interpreting the principle of relativity, Hoijer points out the differences observed in the concept of colours be­tween the SAE languages and the Navaho Indian language. The Navaho and the SAE languages divide the spectrum in an identical way apart from two differences. What we here in Europe see and call “black” is divided into two different conceptual units by the Navahos. But the section which we divide into “blue” and “green” is considered to be an indivisible conceptual unit by the Navahos.

Whorf proclaims the compulsory character of the linguistic system, by which he understands that the linguistic system which determines thinking is a phenomenon of back­ground character, uncontrollable and beyond the conscious­ness of the speaker. Thinking always takes place along linguistic lines, not only by means of words but also in the form assumed by the linguistic components and the grammatical system, which sometimes assert themselves in quite an abstract fashion.

According to Whorf, the structure of a language is interlinked with the whole cultural pattern. In the course of history, language and culture have advanced together and have mutually influenced each other. But language is the factor which sets the limits to progress. The rigidness of linguistic forms can hinder the progress of culture — the spreading of new scientific results for instance.

7.3. We have tried to summarize in a nutshell the most important thesis of metalinguistics.

The most significant is undoubtedly the one which states that peoples of different languages do not comprehend the outside world in the same way and do not judge it in the same manner.

First of all, we have to examine whether this statement is correct. In our opinion, it is not. It is not correct, be­cause we become acquainted with the surrounding world not only through the medium of linguistic material but also di­rect. It is true that the mother tongue suggests a certain mode of interpretation but this is constantly corrected and adjusted by direct experience. Or, to keep to our terminol­ogy, as all languages are systems “sui generis”, all lan­guages divide and classify the outside world in a different way according to their own individual categories of mean­ing.

But the outside world, i. e. the world of denotata, can be approached not only through the categories of meaning but also direct. We not only acquire the knowledge that fire is hot through the words “warm”, “hot”, etc., in the mother tongue which accumulate the experience of many former generations, but also through the experience of burn­ing our hand in childhood. Although the world of mean­ings is different and theoretically incomparable and incom­mensurable from one nation to another, the denotata amongst which people live are, in fact, the same for all humanity or, at least, for a great number of people.

We must here touch upon a frequent misconception. Some authors consider — under the influence of metalinguis­tics — that the various languages determine the philosoph­ical outlook (“Weltanschauung”) of people in different ways. It goes without saying that this view is totally incorrect. That the mother tongue does not determine the philosoph­ical outlook is clearly proved by the fact that people speak­ing the same language can, and often do, hold different outlooks. Let us take only one of thousands of examples — the idealist, Hegel, and the materialist, Feuerbach, who both spoke the same language, German.

But let us return to the often cited example of the colour spectrum. We have to accept the fact that there are no such distinct meanings as “blue” and “green” in the Navaho language. But this does not mean that in the reality surrounding the Navahos there is no blue and green colour, or that from the standpoint of language green and blue could not be denotata. And, if, through the medium of their language, the Navahos cannot grasp the difference between green and blue, they can still see it with their eyes, that is, by their direct experience, just as we Euro­peans can divide into nuances that section of the spectrum which should be seen as uniformly black on the basis of the meanings of our respective languages. [...]

According to Whorf’s theory, language is the factor which limits the progress of culture. Again, we have to reject this assumption. We have referred to the relationship be­tween language and culture in the first chapter. We have also mentioned that language does not belong to culture but is a means of social communication. As language is a means of social communication and not a part of culture, language and culture are two phenomena of a basically different character. Language, therefore, cannot be a part of culture, i. e. it cannot be regarded as one of its aspects, but only as its implement. Language is a more elemental phenomenon of human life than culture, in that language has to satisfy a more vital need.

7.4. Now, let us briefly examine the question of trans­lation, since its manifold aspects have a bearing on the problems which have arisen in connection with metalinguistics.

With regard to translation, the opinion is constantly voiced that there can be no happy and absolutely adequate translation. What gives rise to this conception? It is the otherwise obvious and undeniable fact that languages differ not only in their signs but also in their system of meanings. In this way — the argument continues — the meanings of two different languages, precisely because they are dis­parate and not coextensive, can never be exactly arranged to “cover each other”.

And, if we conceive of translation as a process in which one has to proceed “from meaning to meaning”, then we have every reason for thinking that the task is impossible. In practice, however, translation never proceeds from mean­ing to meaning. Translation, as a process, is nothing more than an activity in which a denotatum indicated by the mean­ing of a certain language is rendered by the meanings of the language into which the translation is made.

We have mentioned before the Hungarian expression “Csutortokot mondani”. This can be translated into English in two ways. If we want to remain at the meaning level we have to translate it as “To say a Thursday”. At the denotatum level, however, we have to translate it as “to be frustrated”, “fail”, “not to succeed”.

Just as, in the case of synonyms, we distinguished be­tween “denotatum synonyms” and “meaning synonyms”, so, in the case of translation, we have to distinguish between “denotatum translation” and “meaning translation”. The “meaning translation” generally is an imperfect translation; if this is not so, it is a sheer coincidence. The “denotatum translation” is the correct translation.

The aim of all translation is to express in one’s own language a denotatum indicated in another language. Therefore, it is not true to say that, in the case of transla­tion, we are directly interested in meanings. On this basis, we can state that translation, even a happy translation, is possible not merely in principle but also in practice. Although the meanings are not identical in different lan­guages, the same denotata can be expressed via meanings of varying type, scope and nature.

Although, at the meaning level, there is an unbridge­able gap between the speakers of different languages, on the level of denotata, comprehension is not really limited.