Current regulation of international armed conflict

15.6.1 Lawful combatants

a) Traditional Law

Big powers

· it was in their interests to exclude any one other than members of the regular army from the class of lawful combatants, to restrict the numbers of people who were legally entitled to fight back in case of invasion

· it was also in their interests to limit the rights of civilian populations under occupation

Small and middle-sized states

· Succeeded in extracting concessions for militias and volunteer corps and for civilian populations

· Also excluded possibility that occupying power could acquire ipso facto sovereign rights over territory it invaded

Big and small states reached a compromise.

In practice, between 1907-1939, war fought mainly by regular armies, only on a few occasions did other lawful combatants take up arms.

b) New Law

15.6.2 Conduct of hostilities: means of warfare

a) Traditional law

Only weapons which were ineffective or might imperil life of their users were proscribed:

· Explosive projectiles weighing under 400 grams (ineffective)

· Poisonous weapons, asphyxiating gases, automatic submarine contact mines (dangerous to users)

Really important or effective weapons were not banned, like aircraft & hot air balloons.

General principle (1899 and 1907 codifications) against weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering:

· Minor arms like lances with barbed heads

· Irregularly shaped bullets

· Projectiles filled with broken glass

Also, could not use indiscriminate weapons (that could not distinguish between civilian and combatant) or use weapons indiscriminately.

b) New law

General rules have proved unworkable because too loose.

Specific bans on specific bans have been more helpful:

· use of chemical and bacteriological weapons (1925 – Geneva Protocol)

· manufacturing and stockpiling of bacteriological weapons (1972 – specific Convention)

· any weapon whose primary effect is to injure with fragments non-detectable in human body by x-ray (1980 – Convention with three protocols) [these weapons don’t actually exist, ppl thought US had them]

· use of land mines, booby traps and other devices if employed indiscriminately and against civilians (1980 – Convention with three protocols, amended in 1996 to be stronger re land mines)

· incendiary weapons used to attack civilian or civilian objects, or military targets located within civilian concentration (1980 – Convention with three protocols)

· blinding laser weapons (1995 - Fourth Protocol)

· hostile use of environmental modification techniques (1976 – Convention)

· use, production, stockpiling and transfer of antipersonnel mines (1997 – Ottawa Convention)

Advantages to specific bans:

· Since relevant int’l convention actually describes weapon, high degree of certainty created about what kinds of weapons are outlawed.

· Provides normative guidance in spite of lack of enforcement mechanisms – states have by in large followed these bans

Disadvantages to specific bans

· Bans tend to be about weapons that have minor military effectiveness or would hurt person using them

· Has not been extended to weapons which are really effective, like aerial bombardment or atomic weapons

· Bans on minor weapons can be bypassed by new and sophisticated weapons which do not fall under prohibitions

c) Nuclear weapons

Theoretical use of nuclear weapons:

1. Aggressive first strike – to launch an attack against another state, initiating war

2. Pre-emptive first strike – to make a pre-emptive attack on another state, when attacking first state believes the other state is about to launch a nuclear attack

3. Second use in self-defence – to respond in kind to a nuclear attack (or other weapon of mass destruction) by another state

4. First use in conventional war – to inflict devastating losses on enemy in the course of a conventional war

5. Retaliatory use in conventional war - To retaliate against enemy’s first use of nuclear weapons, weapon of mass destruction, chemical or biological weapons, in the course of conventional war

а Nuclear powers justify uses under 2, 3, and 5

Law’s response:

· No treaties or customary law (thank god!) on use of nuclear weapons

· Analogies to be drawn from customary rules of int’l humanitarian law

1. Aggressive first strike – would be contrary to Art. 2.4, prohibition of attack not in self-defence

Ш ICJ, Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons

2. Pre-emptive first strike – would again seem contrary to Art. 2.4, because art. 51 of UN Charter does not authorize such strikes, whatever arms concerned.

Ш ICJ, Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons – failed to comment on this question.

3. Second use in self-defence – lawful if it meets requirements:

o necessity and proportionality – ICJ re-iterated this in Nicaragua

o protection of civilians & unnecessary suffering to combatants

o neutrality and inviolability of third powers

Ш ICJ mentioned all these in Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons but made a very ambiguous ruling.

· Doubtful that nuclear weapons can be used in such a manner that meets all these requirements. But some nuclear states insist that tactical nuclear weapons could be used in ways that respect int'l law.

4. First use in conventional war – would be contrary to requirements above and be absolutely illegal

5. Retaliatory use in conventional war – could be lawful if clearly met requirements above

15.6.3 Conduct of hostilities: methods of combat

a) Traditional Law

Two sets of rules:

Those meeting needs of belligerents, regardless of power

· Prohibiting treachery (article 23(b) of Hague Regulations)

· The killing or wounding of enemies who have laid down their arms or have no means of defence and have surrendered (art. 23(c))

· Declaration that defeated enemies who surrender will not be killed (art. 23(d))

· Improper use of flags of truce or military insignia

· Pillage

· Permissions on spying

Those which were calculated to (or did in fact) favour the stronger states

· Belligerents must not attack either from land or from sea undefended towns, villages, dwellings or buildings (art. 25); but there was no definition about ‘undefended’ or a mechanism to determine, hence an invading power could simply refuse to recognise it as un-defended

· Officer in command of an attacking force must do all in his power to warn authorities before commencing a bombardment, except in cases of assault (art. 26)

· All necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, churches, works of art, hospital and historic monuments (art 27)

b) New Law

Modern int’l regulation of methods of combat has become even more uncertain and ineffective than it was under traditional regime.

Principles

· Can’t attack civilian objects alone or hit military and civilian objects indiscriminately

· When launching an attack, precautions must be taken to spare civilian objects

· In case an attack on military objective cannot but cause incidental civilian loss of life or destruction of property, precautions must be taken to ensure losses are not out of proportion to military advantage obtained.

These are very vague and have been very loosely interpreted. They do, however, provide some mitigation of the carnage of war.

These principles were clarified and given legal precision (as much as possible) in Protocol I, 1977.

· General definition of military objectives – but so sweeping it can cover almost anything (art 52.2)

· Definitions of indiscriminate attacks (art. 51.4 and 51.5)

· Definitions of precautionary measures when launching an attack (art. 57 and 58)

· Various provisions on civilian objects (art. 52-6)

· Provisions on non-defended localities (art. 59) and de-militarized zones (art. 60)

· Most strong military powers objected to these rules, and only Britain ratified the Protocol with numerous reservations.

· Therefore, although these build upon, expand, and give precision to customary law, these provisions have not become generally binding (in fact custom) and are binding only on signatories to protocol.

· Except – Art. 57 and 58 on precautions on collateral civilian casualties, because they specify pre-existing norms and do not appear to be contested by any state, including those which have not ratified

Ш ICTY, Kupreskic

· BUT – prohibition of use of methods intended to cause long-term damage to natural environment and prejudice health and survival of population (art. 55)

o Response to Vietnam war

o Supported by practically all states а reflects a general consensus of states and is thus binding on all members of int’l community

Ш but ICJ in Nuclear weapons case not sure that general consensus makes it binding on everyone, said only binding on state parties

15.6.4 Protection of war victims

a) Traditional Law

· Laws protecting war victims (those who do not take part in hostilities or are now no longer able to due to wounds, sickness, shipwreck) was much stronger than other areas of law of war.

· Because it is in the interests of military powers to safeguard members of their war victims (principle of reciprocity)

b) New Law

· Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol I of 1977 set out extensive and detailed int’l laws protecting war victims.

· Creates status of prisoner of war - those who fall into hands of enemy, either through surrender, wounded, shipwreck

o may be interned in POW camps far from combat zone

o must be held in good health and treated humanely

o have rights to freedom from violence and intimidation

· Civilians are protected if they are in hands of adversary either from outset of hostilities or after occupation.

· But those who happen to be in combat zones only protected by Protocol I.

15.6.5 Means of ensuring compliance with law

a) Traditional Law

· Lack of compliance mechanisms was major weak point of traditional laws of warfare.

Three devices were used for compliance:

· Belligerent reprisals – maltreatment of prisoners, bombing of undefended localities (a v. bad idea)

· Criminal punishment of enemy combatants or civilians guilty of war crimes – usually victor’s justice

· Payment of compensation for any violation perpetrated – victor’s justice

b) New Law

Reprisals

· Most rudimentary and widespread means of inducing compliance with law

· 1949 Geneva Conventions banned reprisals against ‘protected persons’ (POWs & civilians in hands of enemy)

· Bans have now turned into customary law

· BUT Reprisals against civilians in combat zones were implicitly permitted

· 1974-77 Conference – extended the ban to civilian persons or civilians finding themselves in combat zones (art. 51.6, 53(c), 54.4, 55.2, 56.4 of Protocol I)

o Due to strong opposition of many states to their provisions, they remain treaty law, and bind only states which ratify or accede to protocol without reservations.

o BUT ICTY, Kupreskic – advanced view that demands of humanity and dictates of conscience (opinio necessitatis) created a customary rule also binding on states who are not signatories, because all states now have means other than reprisals to induce compliance with int’l laws of war

Penal repression of breaches

· Serious violations of int’l humanitarian law may be prosecuted and repressed by national courts and at int’l level through special courts, tribunals, and now ICC.

· This is a good development.

Protecting Powers

· 1949 Geneva Conventions codified and improved on int’l practice by providing that each belligerent could appoint a third state as a “protecting party”, but this required consent of both parties

· Each state would have a protecting power (or they could both have same one), they would act as referees, scrutinizing implementation of Conventions

· 1949 Convention advanced this by creating “substitutes for protecting powers”

o Detaining power (state detaining enemy wounded, POWs, etc.) was duty bound to accept the offer of services of a humanitarian organization, such International Committee of Red Cross to assume functions performed by Protecting Powers

· In practice, protecting power systems resorted to in only five cases

· Furthermore, states have often refused to accept offer of ICRC to act as substitute; and ICRC has sometimes been reluctant to step in

· System further institutionalized and specified in Article 5 of First Protocol, 1977