Power factors that cause war

While the evolutionary perspective provides a way of understanding why war has not been eliminated from human society through natural selection processes, it is not as useful when it comes to determining the specific conditions that make war likely or how those conditions might be altered to avert war. In other words, while it might be true that most wars are about competition over resources at some level, we can learn other things about war that might ultimately be more valuable in help­ing us prevent it. Another way of approaching the causes of war is to look at those power factors that influence the probability of war. In his book Causes of War, Stephen Van Evera explores five major causes of war that he argues can be prevented, reduced, or addressed in some way. The first cause he looks at is false optimism. War is more likely, he argues, “when states fall prey to false optimism about its outcome”. In other words, if the losers could foresee their defeat and both sides could foretell the costs, they would not pursue war. The future losers would settle the dispute rather than taking up arms, and all would avoid the costs. It is our inability to see into the future and the false hopes this allows that lead states to war. The second cause of war that Van Evera examines revolves around the first-strike advantage, a situation in which the first to use force gains an advantage over the adversary. He argues, “War is more likely when the advantage lies with the first side to mobilize or attack”. In short, by improving the attacker’s prospects of victory, the first-strike advantage creates the temptation to start war. The third cause of war involves power shifts and vulnerability. He maintains: “War is more likely when the relative power of states fluctuates sharply – that is, when windows of opportunity and vul­nerability are large”. Another way of putting this idea is that “War is more likely when states expect better results from a war begun now than a war begun later”. A declining state, for example, might decide to launch a war now in order to prevent a future conflict under less attractive circumstances. The fourth cause revolves around cumulative resources, which Van Evera defines as a possession that “helps its possessor to protect or acquire other resources”. He argues: “War is more likely when resources are cumulative – that is, when the control of resources enables a state to protect or acquire other resources”. For example, industrial capacity is a cumulative resource since states cannot be military powers without a large indus­trial base. Wars are fought for control of the world’s strongest industrial regions, and the winners of these conflicts significantly increase their profits and power. Finally, Van Evera argues that “war is more likely when conquest is easy”. If a state feels it has nothing to lose and something to gain, it is more likely to go to war.

UNIT 6