Evaluating Nuclear Weapons and Proxies

Another suggestion would be attempting to acquire nuclear components from North Korea, Iran, Pakistan or India. A couple of these regimes might hand off a nuclear weapon to a non-state actor or proxy of some sort, one that would detonate it at a mutually-agreeable target as soon as possible. One of these countries may use a shipping container or some other clandestine means, cooperating with a proxy, to carry out an attack on a target, the deniable use of nuclear weapons.

Three factors must be considered when addressing the above scenario. The first is an issue of trust and control. Non-state, militant proxies like the PCCTS, Knights Templar would rely on patrons, a country, for support and training. But we have our own interests as well and we hold them close. Furthermore, there is no central hierarchy in the PCCTS, Knights Templar as we are the sum of autonomous and completely independent cells. It is therefore not a monolithic, unified entity but an extremely distributed network. A majority of cells are not yet advanced enough to competently handle a large operation like this.

This of course assumes that a capable regime would ever hand over a nuke to us in the first place. Proxies must be kept dependent; otherwise they cease to be proxies. We do not share some deep bond of trust with any of these regimes. Handing over even a crude nuclear device is anathema to a potential relationship and would destroy the dynamics by which that country enforces its will as a patron. It would have provided an organisation that it can never fully trust with the one true guarantor of sovereignty.

Second, the nuclear device is the product of an immense, expensive national effort. Each individual weapon or device, especially early on, represents an enormous investment of national resources. By handing one over to an outside group, the country not only has no assurance of it being employed in the way they want, but opens itself to the prospect of that immense investment being wasted or misused.

Finally, there is the issue of risk. A nuclear weapon used in a terrorist attack against any of the cultural Marxist EUSSR regimes will be followed by the most intense, broad and meticulous investigation in human history. The fissile material that made it possible will be traced ruthlessly to its source. The necessary investigative processes are not only possible and well understood, but work to improve and further refine them has only intensified and received additional funding after 9/11. Indeed, a country providing a nuclear weapon to the PCCTS, Knights Templar could not have reasonable assurances that it would not come back to haunt them, either through investigation or interrogation of those that carried out the attack.

That country would be opening itself up to responsibility and accountability for our actions. Again, the material will almost certainly be traced back to that country. And it would be them that suffered the consequences.

The closest historical use of a nuclear proxy was North Koreas attempt to share some civilian technology with Syria (dual-use precursor technologies). It quickly decided that the entire idea was too risky and sold Syria out to Israel and the United States, resulting in Israeli airstrikes in Western Syria in 2007. So while the concern about technology sharing is real (and validated by the now infamous network of A.Q. Khan), there are also limitations to how much one country is willing to risk for an autonomous Crusader movement. The Israeli bombing and North Korea’s betrayal of Syria will not be soon forgotten.

But most importantly, the PCCTS, Knights Templar are currently unwilling to detonate a nuclear warhead above 0, 1-0, 2 kt device as the civilian casualties would be too great. A large warhead (several kilotons) would be worthless to us. Furthermore, we currently lack the resources and competence to successfully reverse engineer large nuclear warheads and creating small nuclear devices (briefcase size devices). We may re-evaluate these options at a later time.