Master under pressure to enter port

In giving evidence to an investigation into a grounding in the approaches to a port in New Zealand, the Master and Officers stated that two days before arrival, the Master had sent an email asking if the Pilots had any limitations on swell height for entering as the forecast was for a swell height of 4.5m. The answer received on board was that the maximum wind speed for entering was 40 knots and if the Master and Pilot agreed that the swell was dangerously increasing the vessel's draft, the approach would be aborted.

The Master and Officers then undertook a safety evaluation of the port and approaches and identified hazards including shallow patches, fishing boats and swell. The Master was still concerned on the day of arrival as the forecast was still predicting a swell of up to 4 m. During the early hours of the morning he therefore arranged to undertake a " dry run" in the approaches. The rolling became severe and the Master aborted the approach to the Pilot Station. The Pilot was already underway to meet the vessel but the master said that he had aborted the entry and would try again at 1600.

During the day some discussion took place between the ship and the Marine Manager (of the service provider of tugs and pilots) who maintained that the vessel should have continued into the harbour that morning. The Master stated that, in his professional judgement, it would have been unsafe to enter.

At 1600 the vessel again commenced the approach. The swell was by now reduced and the vessel was rolling about 2 degrees to port and starboard. At 1728 the vessel reached the agreed boarding point and two pilots boarded. Due to the Master's concerns, the Pilots suggested a " dry run" with a break off point 1 mile from the fairway buoy. When the ship reached this point a slow round turn to starboard was taken and the Master agreed to continue entry into port.

Shortly after passing the Fairway buoy the ship started yawing some 6 degrees to starboard and 9 degrees to port with the bow pitching 1.5 m. The Master and Pilot agreed that the swell height was 3m and occasionally up to 4 m. The vessel began rolling about 5 degrees to portand starboard. The Pilot stated to the investigating team that the vessel was not rolling or heaving but yawing.

At 1816, the vessel shuddered as she pitched bow down, rolled and came in to contact with the seabed midway between the fairway Buoy and Nos. 1 and 2 buoys. Five seconds later the vessel touched bottom again.

I find it of concern that a responsible Master was pressurised to proceed with a port approach which he was not comfortable with - a critical point that appears to have been overlooked in the findings of the investigation into the grounding. We can only be thankful that the country concerned did not follow a recent precedent and arrest the Master and Officers.

1. Explain the expressions in bold using English equivalents.
2. A grounding;
3. on swell height;
4. undertook a safety evaluation;
5. shallow patches;
6. the forecast was still predicting;
7. rolling became severe;
8. aborted the approach to the Pilot Station;
9. was underway;
10. the swell was reduced;
11. the vessel was rolling;
12. a 'dry run' with a break off point;
13. after passing the Fairway buoy;
14. the bow pitching 1.5 m;
15. the vessel was not rolling or heaving but yawing;
16. she pitched bow down;

1. Answer the questions

1. What did the Master and Officers state in giving evidence to an investigation into a grounding?
2. Why did the Master abort the approach to the Pilot Station?
3. What discussion took place between the ship and the Marine Manager?
4. When did the vessel again commence the approach to a port?
5. What was the vessel experiencing after passing the Fairway buoy?
6. Why did the vessel come in to contact with the seabed?
7. What critical point has been overlooked in the findings of the investigation into the grounding?

1. Decide if these statements ate true or false. Correct the wrong ones.

1. The Master had not sent an email asking if the Pilots had any limitations on swell height for entering.
2. The maximum wind speed for entering was 40 knots.
3. The Master and officers did not undertake a safety evaluation of the port and approaches.
4. They identified hazards excluding shallow patches, fishing boats and swell.
5. The Master was concerned on the of arrival.
6. He undertook a 'dry run' in the approaches.
7. The rolling did not become severe.
8. The Master aborted the entry because the Pilot was not underway to meet the vessel.
9. The Marine Manager maintained that the vessel should have continued into the harbour that morning.
10. The Master stated that it would have been safe to enter.
11. At 1600 the vessel was 3 m.
12. The vessel was rolling about 2 degrees.
13. At 1728 two pilots boarded the vessel.
14. The Pilots suggested a ' dry run' with a break point agree from the fairway buoy.
15. The master did not agree to continue entry into port.
16. After passing the Fairway buoy the ship started yawing some 9 dergeed to starboard and 6 degrees to port.
17. The vessel was rolling about 5 degrees to port and starboard.
18. The Pilots started to the investigating team that the vessel was rolling or heaving but not yawing.
19. At 1816 the vessel later the vessel touched bottom again.
20. The Master and Officers were arrested.