Taking Avoiding Action too late

I was Chief Officer on a loaded 9, 000 tonnes general cargo vessel with a draft of about 7.5m on a voyage from the US Gulf to the Mediterranean.

The first incident happened off the Florida Coast near Miami when leaving the Florida Straits and heading towards New Providence Channel. With the Gulf Current pushing us, our ground speed was 16.5 knots. The sky was clear and the visibility was good. There was no wind with a calm sea and no swell. During my evening watch, I noticed on my port bow a vessel, which later appeared to be a coastal tug boat with a tow. I started checking her and plotting with the ARPA. I rapidly concluded that the CPA would be nearly zero. It took a while before I could clearly distinguish the towing lights, due to the bright deck lighting of the tug. They were definitely not displaying lights indicating that they where limited in their ability to manoeuvre.

At a distance of less than 2nm, still no action had been taken to avoid a collision, so I started calling on VHF Ch. 16. As I didn't receive any answer, I switched on my searchlight and aimed it at the tugboat. Only then I got their attention. In the meantime we were at a distance of only 1nm from each other. I was called on VHF by the OOW of the tug to ask me what my intentions were and the tug's OOW suggested to make it red to red. My reaction was that this was very wise and that it would be high time to take some action. As a consequence, at less than a mile of each other, the tug had to alter course sharply, with all the risks that such a manoeuvre involves. In order to give more space, I also had to alter my course sharply to starboard. Finally we passed each other at a few cables.

The other incident happened in the Mediterranean, near the Spanish coast, on the same voyage. Our ground speed was about 12 knots, the sky was clear and the visibility very good. There was no wind and the sea was calm, without any swell. During my early morning watch I noticed a vessel approaching from my port bow. I plotted it with the ARPA and the CPA would be about 0.3nm. The vessel approached quickly and there was little or no change in the CPA.

Having in mind the previous incident with the tugboat, I decided to act at an early stage in order to avoid an unnecessary close quarters situation and unpredictable panic reactions.

At a little more than 3.5nm, I altered my course clearly to starboard to increase the CPA of the other vessel, a small loaded tanker. During this manoeuvre I suddenly noticed that the other vessel was altering course to port and was coming towards me. I had to turn sharply to port as we were approaching each other even faster than before. When abreast of each other and very close, I called him on VHF and asked him what he was doing. On the other side an angry voice replied that his manoeuvre was because I wasn't doing anything to avoid a collision. I told him that I was busy altering my course and that his course change to port in such a situation is something one should never do. He kept insisting that I was too late with reacting. Repeating that altering course to port is the very last thing to do wasn't having much effect. Prior this incident, no attempt had been made to try to contact me on VHF or draw my attention in any other way.

In both cases the situations were clear and there was no doubt about the actions to be taken - simply follow the book! Nevertheless, two unnecessary close quarter situations occurred and unnecessary risks were taken, by two people from whom a high level of professionalism would be expected!