Obtaining material for a radiological bomb

When evaluating sources for the acquirement of radiological material a good measurement should be to focus on material with an activity potential of at least more than 5 T Bq. The latest government security overview published in 2010 estimates that more than 2000 tons of radiological material remains unsecured around the world in the strangest of places. Material lies unsecured in thousands of locations such as Russian light houses, abandoned radiotherapy clinics, national industrial or military dumping grounds, abandoned plutonium mines, abandoned military vessels, sunken military vessels (material available to divers) etc.

In order for us to construct and detonate a radiological bomb, we must acquire radioactive material by stealing it or buying it through legal or illegal channels. Possible RDD material could come from the millions of radioactive sources used worldwide in the industry, for medical purposes and in academic applications mainly for research. Of these sources, only nine reactor produced isotopes stand out as being suitable for radiological terror:

· Americium-241 (widely used in smoke detectors, 1 milligram per)

· Californium-252

· Caesium-137 (cesium)

· Cobalt-60

· Iridium-192

· Plutonium-238, 239

· Polonium-210

· Radium-226

· Strontium-90

Of these materials, radium-226 and polonium-210 are considered the least potent. Of these sources the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has estimated that within the US, approximately one source is lost, abandoned or stolen every day of the year. Within the European Union the annual estimate is 70. There exists thousands of such " orphan" sources scattered throughout the world, but of those reported lost, no more than an estimated 20 percent are classified as a potential high security concern if used in a RDD. Especially Russia is believed to house thousands of orphan sources, which were lost following the collapse of the Soviet Union. A large but unknown number of these sources probably belong to our Russian nationalist brothers or sympathisers or the Russian mafia networks. Noteworthy are the Russian very strong beta emitting strontium-90 sources used as radioisotope thermoelectric generators for beacons in lighthouses in remote areas. These were recently (2009) secured by Russian authorities but many were stolen or “lost” prior to this campaign. It is likely that such emitters are still widely available in ex-Soviet republics. In December 2001, three Georgian woodcutters stumbled over such a power generator and dragged it back to their camp site to use it as a heat source. Within hours they suffered from acute radiation sickness and sought hospital treatment. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) later stated that it contained an amount of strontium equivalent to pose a huge risk if ever used with a RDD.

It should be considered relatively easy to acquire at least one of these materials if you have a minimum of information in regards to appropriate sources. It is therefore likely that any Justiciar Knight cell attempting to acquire radiological material will be successful. We, the PCCTS, Knights Templar or any allied liberation organization is likely to obtain radioactive material through the " black market" or by going directly to the sources ourselves. Due to the nature of our hierarchical structure it is unlikely that we can afford purchasing it from criminal organization as the prize would simply be too steep. In any case, the black market remains as one viable option for acquirement. There has been a steady increase in illicit trafficking of radioactive sources from 1996 to 2004. However, these recorded trafficking incidents mainly refer to rediscovered orphan sources without any sign of the criminal activity being linked to patriotic liberation movements.