Aristotle's Ethics of Virtue as the Basis of Social Rights: in the Locus of the Meeting of Ancient and Middle Eastern Cultures

Today Russia is before the alternative of types of social relations: or the common moral law is basis of social life, or the society obeys interests of separate classes. The actuality of Aristotle's ethics of virtue is rationale of interrelation of moral law and social right, but Aristotle's model of interrelation of moral law and social life is possible only in historical and in cultural conditions of classical Greek polis, and the Aristotle's model can only partly be realized in the Russian state. Moreover, Aristotle was creating the doctrine of ethics in order to overcome the crisis of Greek political culture. It was impossible to perform, because the cause of the crisis was the Greek understanding of virtue. The Greek understanding of virtue was demanding of adjustments, including those from the Middle East and Asia Minor crops. On the other hand, Aristotle's ethics of virtue is an anatomy of the moral act. The Aristotle's ethics is effective in understanding of consequences of moral act for society and absolutely relevant today as a method of analysis of the existing social relations. We believe, that a comparative analysis of the Aristotle's concept of virtue in the locus meeting of ancient and Middle Eastern cultures can make adjustments to the analysis of the interrelation of the moral law and social right and actualize in the public mind the role and importance for the social life of the common moral law.

The Aristotle's virtue is reasonable control of desire, respect for the rights of another person. Virtue is a reflection about moral act and its consequences, afore to make it. It always is the choice is virtuous, unlike from blind subjection to norm and sample. To be virtuous means the battle with himself, because virtue is not given to us by nature: «From this it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature», 1 «Therefore virtue also is in our own power, and so too vice. For where it is in our power to act it is also in our power not to act, and vice versa, so that, if to act, where this is noble, is in our power, not to act, which will be base, will also be in our power, and if not act, where this is noble, is in our power, to act, which will be base, will also be in our power. Now if it is in our power to do noble or base acts, and likewise in our power not to do them, and this was what being good or bad meant, then it is in our power to be virtuous or vicious»2.

Mission of virtue is regulation of social relations in order to be not violated rights and good of citizens. Accordingly virtue is the basis of the best state system, as collective understanding of good.

But in human will to be or not to be virtuous. Person makes moral choices freely. One can to prepare the person through education to understanding of meaning of moral act for individual life and public life. So Aristotle raised before us a problem of freedom of moral choices.

Also moral choices are made in certain axiological field, in which limits of moral choices are established. Limits of axiological field are coordinated with the basis of this culture: with the concepts of good and evil. We suppose that the overcome of crisis of ancient culture was impossible because of the limitation of axiological field of ancient culture that was determinate a understanding of good and evil.

We suppose that thralldom was inherent part of axiological field of ancient culture. Thralls were necessary to city-state economically and socially plan. Thralldom was thought by good because the ancient culture was built on thralldom. The thralldom was personification of infirmity and of suffering of human that permitted to a Hellene to delete a weak side of human nature from perfect image of human.

But exclusion of weak side of human nature would not give an answer about trueness of moral choices in critical situations. The rational society that avoids of the manifestations of deep sensual side of human nature who does not see a weak side of human nature, could not give an answer the question about veritable motives of actions of human as well and about the grounds of unity of society. The axiological field as if does not admit those side of human nature from which the evil and the good can emanate and in which the human is defenseless and weak. If the moral choices are made in all entirety of human nature and understanding of results of moral choices, this moral choices is really a virtue.

According to studies of S.S. Averintsev, another understanding of virtue was in cultures of Middle East and Asia Minor. The human of Middle East is corporally vulnerable; he experiences all entirety of human suffering. «This is image of a body suffering", in which, however, lives such heat " intimate", the heat " internal", the heat " heart-to-heart"..».3 Therefore the human seeks his God as his protector. Thus in cultures of Middle East and Asia Minor were prepared the basics of transcendental order. The idea of order is speculative, the idea comes from the outside, because source of order is God.

If human hears a will of God it means he can hear other human. This is not the agreement about the mutual good between equal citizens, this is the dialogue about essence of existence when the human seeks to find «a source of Life» «beside oneself, in a different, be this other the God or the human», 4 I must to need in a different. The cultures of Middle East and Asia Minor have created their understanding of virtue as control of desires; these cultures not exclude a weak side of human nature. The essence of virtue are the asceticism and a obedience of God's will, for the person can realize himself in full measure only in obedience to God's will. «The cosmos can have to this to personal God only personal relationship namely relationship of submissiveness», this is austerity5. The obedience of God's will is the performance of God's will, is the acceptance of responsibility for their acts before face of objective judge and is the understanding of effects of disobedience of God's will.

Thus the cultures of Middle East and Asia Minor have created other bases of social justice namely citizens are united by unanimous understanding of virtue and of common good, but the virtue is created in human not in the conditions of wonderful and safe Life which is based on slave labor, opposite, virtue is created in conditions of real moral choice which is made in understanding of all the fullness of human nature and of the strength of her weakness. Natural that only the personal God can be basis of dialogue of all citizens, for all are equal before laws of God, God is objective and absolute good which not have of human weakness.

Thus, Aristotle's ethics of virtue has established a basis of understanding of organization of just state, ethics has established a basis of understanding of anatomy of moral act, what has become importantly today. But Aristotle's ethics of virtue was in axiological field of ancient culture which excluded the image of suffering human. The axiological field of cultures of Middle East and Asia Minor can complete and expand a possible axiological field of ancient culture. The austerity and the obedience to God were an alternative to rational middle between pleasure and suffering of equal citizens. Such virtue was basis of social justice. These two concepts of virtue complement each other therefore they can serve as a moral beacon for the Russian social development.

References:

1. Aristotle 1999: book 2, 1.

2. Aristotle 1999: book 3, 5.

3. Averintsev 2004а: 67.

4. Averintsev 2004: 50.

5. Averintsev 2004а: 90.

Literature

Aristotle 1999 Nicomachean Ethics / based on the translation by W. D. Ross.– Kithener.

Averintsev S.S. 2004a Poetics of early Byzantine literature. – SPb. [in Russian language]

Averintsev S.S. 2004 The image of antiquity. – SPb. [in Russian language]

[21] Svetlana Neretina

Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Russian State University for the Humanities, Moscow, Russian Federation

The Understanding of Good in " Nicomachean Ethics" of Aristotle and " Ethics" of Abelard

1. The comparison of two things (in this case - the two ethical teachings) was called by the crisis of understanding of life’s meaning and the fundamental principles of philosophy. Abelard’s " Ethics, or Know thyself" and " Dialogue among philosopher, Jew and Christian" appeared at the time that is determined by the split of the Church and by matching of three world religions and of Greek philosophy, but the main thing is the separation philosophy and theology. Abelard carefully listened to the Hellenistic ethical thought and immediately and bluntly answers (in accordance with the concept of Aristotle " Nicomachean Ethics") from the beginning " and leads to the beginnings" (1095a 30).

2. The beginning, according to Abelard, is in a paradox of simultaneous dually-given pure (heavenly, divine, transcendent, ineffable) world and empirically-given occasional bodily (earthly) world. The first is the Good; the second is both the good and vicious. The beginning as the truth, according to Aristotle, is possible to get or to acquire through education. For the Christian the truth is that it tries to master the person. Comprehending the notion of such truth, a person directs the mind not outside, in the policy, but inside of his soul, giving rise to the Castle of Heaven, the home of the Good. " Ethics" of Master Peter no accident begins with reference to the words not of Aristotle, but Socrates.

3. Despite the general idea of striving for the Good, the understanding of Good and even identity and purpose of good and aim, law, act, and other concepts are others at the doctrine of Abelard. His ethical world in which the concepts proposed by Aristotle used are also others: man is conceived (in the prospect) not of the earthly city, but of God. The path to Good starts with the definition of sin (understood not as a crime of civil law, as the contempt of God) and moves through the confession. The act of a person is not aimed at the external common good, which in Aristotle there is a " beautiful" good of one person – because for him people in general is important – and Abelard focuses on the human personality. The Aristotelian list and definitions of good, virtue, etc., are important for civil policy, Abelard proposes a list and definitions of desire, anger, fear, courage, anger, joy, love, hate, sadness, envy, self-pity – all the existential support of the soul – as the obstacles to Good.

4. The focus of Abelard’s " Ethics" is aimed on the analysis of the ethical intentions and the notion of intention (as conscious intent and content of thought). The act as the result of the consent of the soul for the accomplishment of the action is not presented as the focus and purpose of ethics (1095 and 5-10), but as the inaccurate expression of intention, being an act of inner responsibility. It is weighty correction of Aristotle. For Abelard, whose analysis is directed to the inner content of mind, the act is only something obvious and is not hidden and people preferred to weigh the state of their guilty, than the consequences of the act. Intention which is important also for Aristotle appeared as " conscious choice" (1097a 20), " activity of the soul", the desire-orexis (1139a 18) and have been theoretically developed by Abelard.

5. The concepts of the offense and sin in the doctrines of Aristotle and Abelard are close in values, but not according to meaning. Misconduct that can be unconscious is valued in terms of the positive law. Sin is the guilty in front of God and the contempt for God, even though it may be hidden in the soul. Therefore, sin is a conscious act of the soul. It is subject to the judgment of God (natural law), who " measures the guilty in our intentions", the earthly court (positive law) " explores the criminal acts", which refers to the flesh, to the external acts.

6. For Abelard, the division of mental and moral virtues is impossible. For him, mental virtue which has the aim of the Good is thereby already moral. Abelard understands the Good that is subject of our soul, especially the Supreme Good. The highest Good is God. Fortunately a transcendental Good is understandable through a deliberation as a kind of " sum of ethics". All human abilities and disciplines strive to it. However, in contrast to Aristotle who consider the " golden mean" as the measure of good (1107a 33), Abelard believes that this Good there is always " something more". That was the argument of Anselm of Canterbury in his approval of the existence of God. That " something more" is directed by love and by the human and Godly energy. Without love you can conceive the being, but not a thought, nor life, nor soul. Amor is a life-giving force of all ethical aspirations.

7. It is known that Heidegger translated the word " soul" of the fragment 1139b 15 " Nicomachean Ethics" as “Dasein”. For Abelard anima corresponds to life, because life permeates of love as the power. This desire for the highest Good is fundamentally differ, despite the apparent similarities with the Aristotelian intentions.

[22] Alexander Klestov

Ph.D., St. Petersburg, Russian Federation

Translatio Studiorum: Nicomachean Ethics in the Earlier University Commentaries (1200-1274)

1. Translatio studiorum.

The continuity in the teaching or translatio studiorum is the direction of the activity St. Augustine, marked his pedagogical works and especially, «De doctrina christiana».1 For Augustine, as N.P. Kibardin writes, the most important argument in favor of Christian education is his moral-practical value, i.e. itself necessity of the Christian teaching of one person by another is " the best means for unity of people, and the outpouring of mutual co-solution like a shower" 2. So, being a professional rhetorician Augustine, in this case, does not disregard such an important activity for Christians. He developed a new concept of education, on the one hand based on the idea of the order of knowledge, taken out of the Neo-Pythagorean and Neo-Platonic sources, as stressed by N. Kibardin: “He now admits that philosophers, especially Platonists, taught the truth, and sometimes their propositions sometimes were agree with the Christian faith” (PL XXXIV, De doctrina christiana, lib., IV, 60, p. 63), 3 and here he developed the idea of ordered love (dilectio ordinata), as a methodological basis of Christian education. On the other hand, Augustine draws on the Old Testament, or better said, a well-known fact of assignment of gold and silver (Ex 3, 22, 12, 35-36), who became the his doctrine of the movement of knowledge in the history. Augustine compares the truths of knowledge and their dissemination with the fact of the removal of gold and silver which some Jews were given during the Exodus from Egypt and justified by God. This idea was well-known in the Middle Ages, confirmed in the study of the movement of knowledge from East to West in Hugh of St. Victor, and Otton of Freisingen. Then in early university knowledge, it had significance for entering Aristotelisme in traditional Latin language environment.

2. Corpus Aristotelicum and Albert the Great.

We have a single source of the first half of the XIX century, which includes almost all known to date material for translation of works of Aristotle into Latin in the Middle Ages, it is Amable Jourdain: «Recherches critique sur l’age et l’origine des traductions latines d’Aristotele et sur des commentaires grecs ou arabes employé s par les docteurs scolastiques,... par Amable Jourdain... Paris, MD CCC XLIII. Work distinguishes solid scholarship and fundamental exposition. Close sources to us, only specify names, and date unknown minor part Stagirite, here are: Ferdinand von Steenberghen, Aristote in the West. The Origins of Latin Aristotelisme, Louvain, 1955. M -T. d’Alverny “Translations and Translators”// in R. L. Benson, G. Constable, C.D. Lenham (eds.), Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, (1982), pp. 421‐ 462; Jean Jolivet «The arabic inheritance» // in: A History of Twelfth Century Western Philosophy ed. By Peter Dronke, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 113-149. Alain de Libera, La philosophie mé diè vale, Paris, 1995. In recent years, there are works, exploring Greek, Jewish, Arab treatises translated into Latin by the individual sciences: astronomy, medicine, mathematics and law.

Finally, the work of Concetto Marchesi is dedicated our topic: L’Etica Nicomachea nella tradizione latina Medievale (Documenti ed Appunti), Messina, 1904.

It becomes known to most of the works of Aristotle in the XVIII century. Some Aristotelian translations of Boethius on logic, is considered lost (Analitica priora, Topica, De interpretationes) were re-opened. These texts, together with a translation Second analysts by James from Venice (about 1125-1150) are now called Logica nova, in contrast to the Logica Vetus. There are available Libri naturalis, especially Physics, De anima, De coelo and Metaphisica, Nicomachean Ethics, Book II and III. Also works on biology, for example, De generatione et Corruptione. Over time, new translations, some of them competing with each other, complement the other.

Corpus aristotelicum according to Albert the Great (around 1250) consisted: De Physica auditu (About Physics), De Coelo et Mundo (On the Heavens and in the world), De natura locorum (On Nature), De Proprietatibus elementorum (Elements), De Generatione et Corruptione (The birth and smoldering), Meteorum (About Meteorology), Mineralium (About minerals), De Anima (On the soul), De Nutrimento (about nutrition), De Sensu et Sensato (Personal feeling and sensory), De Memoria et Reminiscentia (About memory and memory), De intellectu et Intellegibili (About mind and reasonable), De Somno et Vigilia (About sleep and wakefulness), De Juventute et senectute ( On youth and old age), De Inspiratione et Respiratione (About the breath and evaporation), De Motu animalium (On the motion of the soul), De Plantis (About plants), De Animalibus (About souls), Metaphysicae (Metaphysics), De Natura et Origine animae (On the nature and origin of the soul), De Causis et Processu universitatis (On the causes and the universal motion), De Principiis motus (On the principles of motion), Eticorum (Ethics), Politicorum (Policy).4 Himself as Albertus Magnus could be called the first and the most significant researcher on works of Aristotle in this early period of the history of the university. As for the " Nicomachean Ethics", we have " five of its Latin version" in 1300 and some of them directly back to the Greek original.5 In addition to the above, there is already Ethica nova, including book I. And Liber Ethicorum, which covers all of the books and instead the first three with the alterations and amendments puts text Ethica nova and Ethica vetus. And then through the " Arab Bridge» (Marchesi) we come to two different Latin transcriptions " Nicomachean Ethics": Liber Ethicorum - vulgarized compendium of Master Taddeo of Florence... and Liber Minorum Moralium or liber Nicomachae, translated from Arabic into Latin [created] by Hermannus Alemannus in 1240. This retelling of the Ethics, drawn up by Averroes.

3. Nicomachean Ethics in the value orientations of Sciences at the university.

Continuing the theme of the translation, we would like to highlight the work of Michael Scott, first of all because it was a university transfer, rather because Mikhail studied at the University of Paris and therefore his translations of Aristotle - fruit university higher education - not accidental, and focused or expresses a new emerging line in translatio of aristotelicien philosophy. " Transfer De Animalibus by Avicenna - writes in this sense d’Alverny - solemnly dedicated to the emperor, should be related to the Italian period in the life of Michael Scott, and the Emperor himself paid for publication in 1232. This part is the abbreviated Aristotle’s position, and it’s often included in the Corpus Aristotelicum. Another addition to Aristoteles Latinus more controversially, that is, the translation Ethicum Nicomachae from Greek, attributed to Michael Scott. Publisher of Ethica nova inclined to accept this news, in any case, there is nothing unusual in the fact that when Michael was in the south of Italy, Frederick II or in Sicily, he taught the Greek language and he found the Greek speaking assistant".6 But in fact, we are interested arose about 1250-1259 years occurrence problem Corpus Aristotelicum, in the university educational process.

In mainly were taught sciences trivium and quadrivium, inherited from the schools of the XII century. We find, pointed D’Alverny, that the trivium was not three, but four sciences: dialectic and Logica Vetus of Porphyry by Boethius, then, the rhetoric and the Logica Nova of four books of Aristotle accompanied Ethics that never was in trivium, grammar goes further; finally there is the fourth element of Aristotle, the most famous and largest causes suspicion, it is physics and metaphysics. Thus, there is a transformation of the Faculty of Arts in the Faculty of Philosophy. We would like to emphasize that, in fact, the entry of Greek, Jewish, Arabic language and culture in Latin culture took place in the XII century, that is, the basic outlines of the Mediterranean civilization, we have... The matter is now for the specific mentalité philosophique et theologique, Master Status of the Faculty of Arts in Paris, within the Mediterranean civilization and culture; moreover, it was found that the Corpus Aristotelicum violated the prevailing balance of knowledge - these Boethius and Porphyry in the toga of Aristotle, Macrobius and Martianus Capella with Halkidiy, as Timaeus Plato, Abelard’s and porretanii’s logic - all the usual, it became secondary and relative, and most importantly, Pagan Metaphysics and Physics in the Arab - Muslim version, threatened the Christian faith and undermining the moral foundations, on which held the Sacred texts and the Church sacramenta. Then, in 1250 began the first search for overcoming the existing impasse isn’t without intrigue and petty charges. In the scholastic stage it looked so: As reported in M - M Dyufey, " compromise is read between the lines of the program [training], " in spite of the papal interdict in 1215 and 1231 years, " the whole Aristotle is included in the program, but parts of a more ancient retains their dominant position: the " old" and " new" logic inaugurates the academic year and the two trimester are studied. The last books that appeared in Paris, those who escaped [from the program] last twenty years [Physics and Metaphysics], studied briefly in the third trimester. Thus, the unity appeared complied”.7 It is clear that this is a temporary compromise between theology and philosophical disciplines, the problem - the lost harmony of faith and reason – obscured, of course, with the entry Corpus Aristotelicum; the problem was ready to break out with renewed vigor, like fire in the value orientations of the XIII century.

4. Thomas Aquinas, Liber Ethicorum and problems of translation.

The difference between theology and philosophical disciplines was considered quite natural “So, with the necessity of philosophical sciences are mind - afirmed Thomas Aquinas - the sacred doctrine known through revelation... Sacred doctrine is principles of knowledge, which began, marked by the color of higher knowledge of God and of the blesse”.8 It seems that Thomas first became acquainted with the writings of Aristotle by Albert the Great. His own comment on the " Nicomachean Ethics" was written later and perhaps at the time of writing the " Summa Theologica" (1265-1273). Thomas commented on Aristotle, while he's in Rome under Pope Urban IV ". At that time, bro. Thomas worked in Rome - the author writes Church history (Tolomeo [Historia Eccles Lib XXII, cap XXIV...]) - Set out almost all of the natural and moral philosophy of Aristotle and made a comment, though mainly on Ethics and Metaphysics, translating unusual and in a new way» 9. It works as follows: On the interpretation, the second analyst, about physics, the first three books about the sky and the world, the first book about the birth and corruption, the first two about meteorology, the last two of the soul about feeling and sensory, memory and recollection, about sleep and vigil, twelve Metaphysics books, ten books about ethics (Liber Ethicorum), a book about politics.

Thomas comments an Aristotle very carefully and every position. He begins with a definition: what is a " good" for man, and then considered wisdom, purpose, justice, purity, intelligence, understanding, friendship, etc. " As the Philosopher say at the beginning of the Metaphysics (Bk 1, Ch 2, 982 a 18;... St. Th 2, 41-42), the case of the wise man is the dispensation of the order. The reason is that wisdom is the highest manifestation of the mind and is, to know the order. If sensual force [soul] learn things in common, yet know the correct ratio of one thing to another it is a property of intellect or reason”.10 We cannot dwell on a detailed analysis of the comment of " Nicomachean Ethics", however we point out the general approach of Thomas to Aristoteles Latinus in this very important movement of translatio studiorum; unlike Albertus Magnus Thomas begins with a critique of the translation of the text: a) belonging the text to Aristotle; b) compliance with the translation true meaning and value of the original.11 Then he turns to the environmental issues between Aristotle and the Christian doctrine. So critical translation is the new which is a historical and scientific component in the university environment Aristotelis Latinus; translation for the first time recognized as a kind of intellectual activity; 2) the other part of the labor is to bring Aristotle's text in order, implying rationally organized division into parts; indicating a general idea of Thomas, like Ibn Rushd, according whose Stagirite’s works represent a plan, " ordered where the composition is, for example, had nothing internally consistent".12 Thomas’s commentary work is extremely thin Augustinian theological - philosophical synthesis in translatio studiorum, which includes almost all the Aristoteles Latinus, and also commentary on the Liber Ethicorum.

Conclusion

XIII century - the time of approval of independent spiritual path of the Catholic Church in the Ptolemaic round Mediterranean acumen. Under the blows of the waves of invasions, the Crusades and the migration of peoples, the Byzantine Empire grew weaker, giving way to one of the other positions of the head of the Christian world. It is important to seize her initiative and heritage, not only in the socio-political sphere (the idea of translatio imperii, the transfer of the empire, who was born in the time of Charlemagne and received a special study in the XII century, Otton Freisingen), but also in the intellectual sphere (the idea of translatio studiorum, knowledge transfer and continuity of teaching in universities is fixed). The idea of Augustine on the transfer of pagan knowledge (continuity) in the Christian intellectual environment becomes a spiritual thing here for Albertus the Greet and Thomas Aquinas.

1. PL XXXIV, De doctrina christiana, lib. IV, cap. IV, p. 91.

2. Kibardin N.P. St. Augustine, bishop of Hippo, as an educator of the clergy. Kazan, 1915, p. 12 (reprint from «Инородческого обозрения». Kн. 10, 1915); The article is part of the author 'pedagogical views bl. Augustine in their historical development and significance; The first chapter of this work is in ЖМНП (Октябрь. 1912, 129-175), under the title " New School of bl. Augustine".

3. Ibid.,. p. 15.

4. Jourdain A. Recherchers... p. 32-33. Сf., Ibid., Note O, pp. 300-358.

5. Marchesi Concetto, Ethica Nicomachae… p. 26 -27.

6. d’Alverny M -T. Translations and Translators”// in R. L. Benson, G. Constable, C.D. Lenham (eds.), Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, (1982, p. 457. A. de Libera La philosophie medievale,... p. svuit.,: Nicomachean Ethics (Vetus: anonim [lib., II-III], XII век; Nova: anonim [lib., I+fragm. of lib., II-X], init., XIII; Robertus Grossetestus 1246-1247; Revis by Grossetest.: anonim., [ Мербеке? ], 1250-1260); Ethica de Evdem (anonim [cap.,. VII, 14 addit to. к Magna moralia, II, 8 in nomine Liber de bona fortuna ], XIII); Politic (Мербеке [ first verse., I-II] ок. 1260; Мербеке [full text], ок. 1260); Economic(anonim fin of the XIII; Durant d’Auvergne, 1295).

7. Dufeil M-M, Guillaume de Saint-Amour et la polé mique universitaire parisienne, 1250-1259. Paris, 1972, p. 151.. etc.

8. S. Thomas Aquinas. Sum., theol., p.1, qu. 1, art. 1 et 2.

9. Cf.,: Luquet G-H, Aristote et l’Université de Paris pendent de XIII-e siè cle, Paris, 1904, pp. 393-394. And also: Marchesi Concetto, L’Etica Nicomachea… p. 72.

10. Cf: Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics by Thomas Aquinas, tr., by C. I. Litzinger (o.p.), v. 1-2, Chicago, 1962, Bk I, Ch. I, Lect. 1.

11. Jourdain A. «Recherches critique sur l’age et l’origine des traductions latines d’Aristole … Paris, MD CCC XLIII, pp. 355, 393 и далее; Luquet G-H., Aristote et l’Université de Paris pendent de XIII-e siè cle, Paris, 1904, pp. 29-34.

12. Libera Alain de, La philosophie mé diè vale, Paris, 1995. p. 325.

[23] José Antonio Poblete

Universidad de los Andes, Chile

Immutability of Natural Law: Philosophical ideas guiding Grosseteste's Latin Translation of the Aristotelian Passage on Natural Justice (1134b18-1135a5)

One might argue whether the Natural Justice passage from the Ethics (1134b18-1135a5) is really crucial or not for understanding Aristotle's account of justice, and yet its tremendous influence upon western ethical and juridical theory is out of any question. Largely, this is due to the prolific reception the passage had among medieval commentators, who, probably on the basis of a Christian philosophical and theological background, paid somehow an exaggerate attention to a rather brief and obscure passage.

In his version of the Natural Justice passage, Grosseteste seems to be aware of handling with a text addressing a chief subject of Christian ethics such as Natural Law. A number of Latin equivalents used within this passage show that he was conscious of possible readings of it which could be regarded at odds with the very foundations of western ethical theory at the time. One of these ground theses regards immutability of Natural Justice, which is developed by Aristotle within a discussion he engages in against an influential group of philosophers: the sophists. It is the famous discussion on the existence of 'things that are just by nature ', within which the arguments employed by both sides are mostly related with the presence or absence of change within things that are by nature.

This study aims at establishing that the Latin translation of the discussion against the sophists is far from neutral. Indeed, by consciously altering the original, it seems that Grosseteste would at one time keep Aristotle's work safe from any condemnation, while leaving to the commentators the task of clarifying the sense of Aristotle's now ambiguous way of speaking.

A first step, even if not conclusive, in our discovery and establishment of a reading sided with a philosophical thesis consists in showing that the translator broke his own rendering rules. Thus, I shall highlight a few key-features of the text produced by Grosseteste and of the translation tradition to which his work pertains, in order to rightly acknowledge whether a deviation in his translation practice really obtains or not.

To begin with, Grosseteste's effort was a word-for-word translation. According to this practice, every word in the original was to be translated through one equivalent alone, usually the same one throughout the whole work. Equivocity was scarcely explored and recognized, and thus the production of unsounded Latin phrasing, quite usual. This phenomenon rested in the idea that the final explanation was actually the proper object of the commentator's expositio.

Our attention must be drawn then to all the events where Grosseteste made an exception to his rule of translating word-for-word, either by using an unusual equivalent, either by using an expression to render a single word, either by non translating a word carried in the original or, finally, by inserting a word which was not present in the original. Of course, the occurrence of one of this exceptions does not necessarily speak of a biased reading, and should be usually regarded a mistake or even an effort from the translator to avoid unsound phrasing. However, the discussion against the sophists contained in the Natural Justice passage happens to be a rather short passage where a number of these exception can be indubitably recognized, at the time that all of them are easily explained on account of a single and strong philosophical idea, namely, that things that are by nature are immobile.

Secondly, it is important to keep in mind that when we speak of Grosseteste’s translatio, we actually speak of a revisio, a usual practice among medieval translators. According to it, when a whole work or a fragmentary passage was already translated, it was not to be translated again, but only revised. In the case of Grosseteste, the revised work was Burgundio of Pisa's Antiqua translatio (Vuillemin-Diem and Rashed 1997, 179-180).

Therefore, any alteration with regard to the revised text is to be regarded prima facie conscious and voluntary. Then, we are to discriminate among the multiple alternative reasons that could illuminate such an event. Indeed, ordinarily, these can be explained merely on account of a grammatical basis. For instance, he might have changed an equivalent because he acknowledged a mistake or because he thought there was a more suitable one. Of course, some of the events might still be only mistakes. Finally, some of them would indeed reveal a philosophical reading of the text, becoming thus the proper object of our inquiry.

Grosseteste took about ten years to finish this task, as he was not only translating Aristotle’s text, but also a number of Greek commentaries on it. Thus, it is neither extraneous to our purpose to consider that certain readings from the translator might be deeply guided by the Greek commentators' ideas (Mavroudi 2015, 53).

Besides, the translator added to the text a quite interesting set of notes (his famous notulae) regarding both the content and grammatical features of the translation. This is also quite interesting for us, as we are facing a text produced by someone who was not only a translator but also a highly sophisticated theologian. Actually, the very idea of immutability of Natural Justice is quite recurrent in other works from the author.

The core of this study comprises two sections: the first one is an analysis of a number of key-equivalents which would reveal a conscious intervention from the translator. Then a second section follows, which aims at depicting a consistent reading of the Latin translation. This reading rests on a guiding idea from Grosseteste (which, in my view, is alien to Aristotle's own thinking), namely, that what is by nature is unchangeable. Finally, the same section includes a few examples that show how deep a translation of this sort was able to impact on medieval commentators such as Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas.

[24] Jesse Schupack

University of Notre Dame, USA

Virtue, Happiness, and the Good: Lessons from Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas

We find something like the following view in Plato: virtue consists in a certain state of the agent (a harmonious arrangement of the parts of the soul and an orientation toward the good); and the relation between happiness and virtue, whether causal or constitutive, is such that to live virtuously is to be happy. What is crucially important about this position is that, though virtue is characterized in part in terms of dispositions and values of the agent, it is essential to the agent’s moral worth that she be oriented in a certain way, namely toward pursuit of the Good. The proper state of the agent is essential to happiness—perhaps is even constitutive of happiness—but the state is itself made good because of its orientation toward the Form of the Good. In other words, though to be virtuous is to be happy, and though virtue can be explained by characterizing a certain state of the agent, that state is, in an important sense, not intrinsically good—its goodness is explained by its orientation toward pursuit of Wisdom and the Form of the Good. Let this stand for now as a brief and partial characterization of Platonic ethics.

In Aristotle, on the other hand, we find that the relation of virtue, happiness, and the good would seem to be even tighter than in Platonic ethics. For Aristotle virtue is action in accordance with a thing’s telos and proper function, and goodness is spoken of not univocally but in many way. A thing is said to be good ascriptively: to be a good person is not to be good as such, but to be good relative to the ideal—the telos—of the human species. We do not say that a tiger is better than a snail, only that a tiger is either a good or a bad tiger, and that a snail is either a good or a bad snail. Thus in book I of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle criticizes the Platonic school of thought for taking there to be one supreme goodness which serves as the source and standard of goodness for all other things. For Aristotle, by contrast, there is not one univocal highest good but a variety of goods. In tension with this claim is his assertion in NE VI and X that our good is only fully realized when we in some sense transcend our specific abilities by partaking in the divine activity of contemplation. Insofar as contemplation is the function of the human nature, and insofar as it is properly a divine activity, it turns out that that which is most human—which fulfills our function—is actually a divine activity. The extent to which we realize our humanity is the extent to which we transcend it. Thus, Aristotle's own ethical system seems to strain against itself to articulate a plausible account of eudaimonia. Whereas the good of the tiger is wholly intrinsic to the tiger’s specific form, the good of a person is put in terms of a combination of the person’s form—which includes the capacity for contemplation—and the goodness of the objects which can be the objects of a person’s contemplation. This emerges is in his defense in the Ethics of the claim that the contemplation in which the philosopher must engage as his highest good is contemplation of the divine: “wisdom must be comprehension combined with knowledge—knowledge of the highest objects which has received as it were its proper contemplation. For it would be strange to think that the art of politics, or practical wisdom, is the best knowledge, since man is not the best thing in the world” (1141a19-21, emphasis added). As it turns out, though Aristotle begins by attempting to defend a homonymous conception of goodness, and to do so by giving an account of each thing’s goodness solely in terms of the nature of that thing, he ultimately concludes that the highest good for humans lies not in an intrinsic aspect of the human person but in the human person’s intrinsic ability to contemplate something better than itself—something divine.

In my paper I take up these two threads and turn to the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. I argue that Aquinas, despite his thoroughgoing Aristotelianism, in defining human blessedness as the achievement of a certain sort of relation to God, further distances himself from the paradigm relation of virtue to goodness laid out at the outset of Aristotle’s Ethics —a paradigm of a thing’s good being explainable fully in terms of the nature of that thing. For Aquinas, by contrast, though human virtue is intrinsically related to certain features of human nature, the full account of the human good requires reference to an external object and source of goodness: God. In this way, I conclude, the Thomistic adaption and revision of the framework of the Nicomachean Ethics results in a theory that does considerably more to vindicate Plato than Aristotle insofar as it underscores the inadequacy of a theory that would seek to give a plausible account of human fulfillment without reference to some greater good that can serve as the source of all goodness and the object that orients the activity of a human life.

[25] Antó nio Rocha Martins

University of Lisbon, Portugal