Prohairesis in Aristotle’s Ethics (and Beyond): the Reinterpretation of Aristotle’s Theory of Volition in the First Centuries AD

Aspasius’ commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, Alexander of Aphrodisias' On Fate, Ethical Problems and related texts and the scholia on the Nicomachean Ethics Books II-IV (attributed to Adrastus of Aphrodisias by Kenny and Barnes)1 provide us with an invaluable source of information regarding the reception of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in the first centuries AD, indeed the first substantial evidence about the legacy of Aristotle’s ethics after the silence of the Hellenistic era. In the present contribution I wish to focus on the question whether Aspasius, Alexander and Adrastus are responsible for a Stoicising understanding of notions such as π ρ ο α ί ρ ε σ ι ς, voluntary, τ ὸ ἐ φ ' ἡ μ ῖ ν, deliberation and, on the whole, the cluster of notions related to Aristotle’s theory of volition and will. Commentators (Alberti)2 have pointed out that the notion of π ρ ο α ί ρ ε σ ι ς, for instance, is conceived by Peripatetics of the first centuries AD in line with the interpretation of Stoic thinkers, mainly following the use made this concept by Epictetus in his Discourses. However, the sheer presence of Stoic vocabulary is no proof of there being a real reinterpretation of Aristotle’s ethics unfaithful to the master. Ancient commentators show not only little reluctance to rephrase someone else’s doctrine but also easiness in using pieces of jargon belonging to other philosophical schools–perhaps due to their attempt to present in a favorable light the doctrine of their mentors. And indeed, “by the first century there had developed a common philosophical idiom or jargon, so that even if some term had originally been associated with one particular school the association had receded into the past”.3 A more sober assessment is, hence, called for if we want to ascertain the presence of a Stoicisation of Aristotle’s ethics in the first commentators whose writings have been handed down to us. Likewise, Alexander of Aphrodisias comes to address problems prominent within Stoicism by giving a libertarian twist to Aristotle’s doctrine of τ ὸ ἐ φ ' ἡ μ ῖ ν, deliberation and more generally the question of human freedom (On Fate, especially XI-XV). Unfortunately, Alexander presents himself at the same time as an orthodox interpreter of Aristotle who none the less puts into Aristotle’s mouth claims that are hardly to be found in the original texts. As a result, Peripatetics of the first centuries AD presents us with a scenario that apparently resists simplistic generalisations.

Roughly speaking, by welcoming other concepts and their philosophical burden I take it that interpreters set about two processes, 1) an internalisation of notions such as π ρ ο α ί ρ ε σ ι ς whereby the latter gets reinterpreted (or, perhaps, only rephrased) in line with the Stoic theory of assent to impressions; furthermore, 2) whereas for Aristotle π ρ ο α ί ρ ε σ ι ς denotes a single state later commentators split it into several steps of a complex process (as in the sequence deliberation–assent–desire according to Aspasius) as a consequence of the enrichment that different philosophical traditions bring in. However, as late as in the commentary of Simplicius on Epictetus’ Encheiridion a more Aristotelian conception of π ρ ο α ί ρ ε σ ι ς can be still found side by side its Stoic version. Hence, different tendencies may be active over the centuries and resurface unexpectedly far beyond their original authors.

The project just outlined is part of a broader research concerned with the history of the term π ρ ο α ί ρ ε σ ι ς (together with its conceptual framework) from Aristotle to Aquinas. Indeed, Aquinas articulates his examination of human action in the IaIIae of the Summa notoriously as follows: voluntariness (q. 6), circumstances (q.7), will (q. 8-10), enjoyment (q. 11), intention (q. 12), choice (q. 13), deliberation/counsel (q. 14), consent (q. 15), use (q. 16) and command (q. 17). Such an elaborate inquiry into human action by no means comes out of the blue; on the contrary, it originates from, and take stock of, more than a thousand years of comment and commentaries on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. For these reasons, it would be interesting to follow this evolution of the term from Aristotle, who establishes its philosophical use, onwards by focusing on the process of accumulation of external influence started, to our knowledge, with Aspasius and the other commentators (Alexander, Adrastus) going through the first Christian philosophers (Nemesius, Origen, John of Damascus to name but a few) up to Aquinas. In this contribution I concentrate on the first stages of this millennial process. Needless to say, the history of the notion of π ρ ο α ί ρ ε σ ι ς, considered its prominent position in the NE, is ipso facto a history of the reception of the Nicomachean Ethics.

References

1. Kenny, The Aristotelian Ethics, OUP, Oxford, 1979, p. 37; more cautiously, Barnes, An Introduction to Aspasius, 1999, in Alberti, Sharples, Aspasius: The Earliest Extant Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, 1999, De Gruyter, Berlin-New York, pp. 13-5.

2. Alberti, 1999, in Alberti, Sharples, 1999. Most recently, Steiger, The Aristotelian Notion of Π ρ ο α ί ρ ε σ ι ς, Rhizomata, 2014, p. 36 alludes to the topic as a much-needed future study.

3. Barnes, ibid., p. 5.

[16] Diego De Brasi

Philipps-Universitä t Marburg, Deutschland