From ethics to anthropology: the reception of Nicomachean Ethics in Nemesius’ of Emesa De natura hominis

The treatise On the Nature of Man —the only extant work of Nemesius, bishop of Emesa (Homs) in Syria toward the end of the 4th century BC—has been praised by some scholars as the first example of Christian anthropology, 1 and recognized as one of the most important sources for John’s of Damascus De fide orthodoxa and especially for Thomas Aquinas’ Summa theologiae (I–II qq. 6–17, 22–48).2 Nevertheless this work has been considered for a long time merely a doxography of philosophical theorems which Nemesius diligently copied from his sources.3 Fortunately scholars have begun over the last few years to challenge this view. They stress inter alia that Nemesius’ originality consists in his inclusive approach to and reshaping of pagan sources in order to build an anthropology based on a vision of man as a morally free being.4

Particularly interesting is the fact that—while Nemesius holds a Neoplatonic vision of the relationship between body and soul and strongly criticizes Aristotle for his view of the soul as entelekheia of the body—he makes ample use of the Nicomachean Ethics and of later commentaries on Aristotle’s masterwork in his discussion of choice (prohairesis). Indeed, Nemesius’ chapters on “On the intentional and unintentional”, “On the unintentional”, On the unintentional through ignorance”, “On the intentional”, “On choice”, and “About what things do we deliberate” (29–34. 93, 19–104, 11), present a rather close paraphrase and commentary of EN III 1-5. The chapters “On what is up to us, or on autonomy”, “Concerning what things are up to us” and “For what reasons were we born autonomous? ” (39–41. 112, 7–120, 5) offer, instead, an independent reconsideration of the same (and other Aristotelian) material.5

Building on the excellent work by Emil Dobler, Martin Streck, Robert Sharples, and Philip van der Eijk, who have examined at length the textual parallelisms among the Nicomachean Ethics, some late antique commentaries on Aristotle and Nemesius’ De natura hominis, I propose in this paper to lay out the reasons which may have induced Nemesius to use Aristotle’s Ethics as a basis for his own work. I will argue that Aristotle’s treatment of choice enabled Nemesius to elaborate more precisely his own anthropological position. Nemesius sees the human being as a morally free psychosomatic unity, whose ability to choose between good and evil, based both on its intellect and on its appetites, is deeply rooted in its bodily constitution.6 Thus Nemesius uses Aristotle’ Nicomachean Ethics in order to elaborate a ‘pragmatic’ anthropology, in which he both describes the nature of the human being and exhorts his readers to accept their nature as creatures of God and to commit themselves to a morally irreprehensible life.7

After a brief, introductory overview of the structure of De natura hominis, 8 in which I claim that Nemesius’ discussion of prohairesis must be read as a development of his treatment of the powers of the soul from the ethical perspective, I will focus in the body of my paper on chapter 29–41 of the treatise.

Nemesius does not aim with these chapters to formally examine ethical concepts such as ‘intentional’ and ‘unintentional’. Rather he wants to fully extend the role of human freedom, and in this way tries to eliminate fatalism and determinism as possible concurrent explanations of human agency.9 This is shown especially by three elements.

First of all, Nemesius’ discussion of prohairesis is flanked by a broader analysis of fate (chs. 35-38). Here Nemesius rejects four philosophical positions: 1) the claim of those who argue that the course of the stars governs everything in the world; 2) the Stoic idea that human freedom and fate are compatible; 3) the position of those who claim that although human beings can actually choose from many options, the result of their actions is predetermined and inevitable; 4) the Stoic doctrine that everything repeats itself endlessly.

Secondly Nemesius in his analysis of the ‘intentional’ and of the ‘unintentional’ clearly asserts—following Aristotle—that “we deliberate about things that are up to us and can come about through us, and for which the outcome is unclear, that is, it can come about in one way or another. ‘Up to us’ was said because we deliberate only about practical matters, for it is these that are up to us” (DNH 34. 102, 8–11).10 This claim should be considered, however, with the caveats that Nemesius casts both on generally ‘unintentional’ actions and on actions that are usually considered ‘unintentional through ignorance’ (chs. 30 and 31).

Finally the whole examination of prohairesis as opposed to determinism leads into a discussion of the reasons why humans were created as autonomous beings. Here it becomes clear that Nemesius is moved by a ‘pragmatic’ anthropological concern. Indeed, he clearly states that “from both considerations [ scil. a) man is a rational being b) man has got a material component] it follows that man is necessarily autonomous and is changeable (autexousion kai trepton, DNH 41. 118, 2–3)”. As autonomous and changeable beings, according to Nemesius, humans naturally have the power to make their own choices. In other words, human nature is originally good and evil develops as a consequence of man’s own choices. Nobody can blame God for his/her evil deeds (cf. DNH 41. 119, 4–9). This claim represent a counterpart to the praise of man and its ‘relativization’ at the end of chapter 1, where Nemesius exhorts his readers not to “dishonor our nature … let us not for short-lasting and brief pleasure abandon the enjoyment of all eternal things, but let us preserve our nobility by good deeds, by abstaining from what is low, by a right aim, … and by prayers” (DNH 1. 16, 1–5).

To conclude I will offer a concise summary of my analysis.

References

1. Cf. e.g. W. Telfer, “The birth of Christian anthropology, ” The Journal of Theological Studies, n.s. 13(2), October 1962, 347-354; C. P. Vetten, “Nemesius, ” in: S. Dö pp and W. Geerlings (eds.), Lexikon der Antiken Christlicher Literatur, Freiburg 19992, 449.

2. E. Dobler, Zwei syrische Quellen der theologischen Summa des Thomas von Aquin. Nemesius von Emesa und Johannes von Damaskus. Ihr Einfluss auf die anthropologischen Grundlagen der Moraltheologie (S.Th. I-II, qq. 6-17; 22-48), Fribourg (CH) 2000; cf. also Chr. Schä fer, “Johannes Damascenus und die Ö konomie der Leidenschaften in der Tradition hellenistischer Philosophenschulen, ” in: Chr. Schä fer and M. Thurner, (eds.), Passiones animae. Die Leidenschaften der Seele in der mittelalterlichen Philosophie, Berlin 2009, 29-48.

3. A central role in this assumption plays Werner Jaeger’s seminal study Nemesios von Emesa. Quellenforschung zum Neuplatonismus und seinen Anfaengen bei Poseidonios (Berlin 1914).

4. See e.g. B. Motta, La mediazione estrema. L’antropologia di Nemesio di Emesa fra platonismo e aristotelismo, Padova 2004; M. Streck, Das schö nste Gut: der menschliche Wille bei Nemesius von Emesa und Gregor von Nyssa, Gö ttingen 2005; S. Fö llinger, “Willensfreiheit und Determination bei Nemesios”, in B. Feichtinger, S. Lake and H. Seng, (eds.), Kö rper und Seele. Aspekte spä tantiker Anthropologie, Munich, Lipsia 2006, 143-157; Nemesius, On the Nature of Man, translated with an Introduction and Notes by P. van der Eijk and R. W. Sharples, Liverpool 2008; J. Sö der, “Der Mensch als personifizierte Freiheit bei Nemesios von Emesa, ” in: L. Jansen and C. Jedan (eds.), Philosophische Anthropologie in der Antike, Frankfurt, Lancaster 2010, 363-380.

5. The subdivision in titled chapters is found in the manuscripts with slight variations. I follow here the divisions and titles which Moreno Morani accepts in his critical edition (Nemesii Emeseni De natura hominis edidit M. Morani, Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana, Lipsiae 1987) and employ the titles used in the English translation by Robert Sharples and Philip van der Eijk (see n. 4). The original Greek titles read: 29: π ε ρ ὶ ἑ κ ο υ σ ί ο υ κ α ὶ ἀ κ ο υ σ ί ο υ; 30: π ε ρ ὶ ἀ κ ο υ σ ί ο υ; 31: π ε ρ ὶ τ ο ῦ δ ι ’ ἄ γ ν ο ι α ν ἀ κ ο υ σ ί ο υ; 32: π ε ρ ὶ ἑ κ ο υ σ ί ο υ; 33: π ε ρ ὶ π ρ ο α ι ρ έ σ ε ω ς; 34: π ε ρ ὶ τ ί ν ω ν β ο υ λ ε υ ό μ ε θ α; 39: π ε ρ ὶ τ ο ῦ ἐ φ ’ ἡ μ ῖ ν, ὅ ἐ σ τ ι π ε ρ ὶ τ ο ῦ α ὐ τ ε ξ ο υ σ ί ο υ; 40: π ε ρ ὶ τ ο ῦ τ ί ν α ἐ σ τ ὶ τ ὰ ἐ φ ’ ἡ μ ῖ ν; 41: δ ι ὰ π ο ί α ν α ἰ τ ί α ν α ὐ τ ε ξ ο ύ σ ι ο ι γ ε γ ό ν α μ ε ν.

6. Cf. DNH 27. 88, 3-4 Morani: “The brain and the spinal cord, which is itself part of the brain, are the origin of movement according to choice or to impulse.” On this see Fö llinger, op. cit. n. 4.

7. ‘Pragmatic’ in a sense of Immanuel Kant’s Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (“Die physiologische Menschenkenntniß geht auf die Erforschung dessen, was die Natur aus dem Menschen macht, die pragmatische auf das, was er als freihandelndes Wesen aus sich selber macht, oder machen kann und soll, ” Vorrede, AA VII, 119). On this see D. De Brasi, “Eine neue Bewertung des Kö rpers? Anthropologie und Glauben in den Schriften zur menschlichen Natur des Nemesios von Emesa und Gregor von Nyssa, ” in D. De Brasi and S. Fö llinger, Anthropologie in Antike und Gegenwart. Biologische und philosophische Entwü rfe vom Menschen, Freiburg i.B. 2015, 377–395, esp. 394–5.

8. As Sharples and van der Eijk, op. cit. n. 4, 3 rightly point out, we can recognize after a ‘programmatic introduction’ (ch.1), three main sections: 1. On the soul and its relationship with the body (ch. 2–3); 2. On the body (ch. 4–28); 3. On fate, free will and providence (ch. 29–43).

9. Cf. also Streck, op. cit. n. 4, 83; Fö llinger, op. cit. n. 4.

10. β ο υ λ ε υ ό μ ε θ α ο ὖ ν π ε ρ ὶ τ ῶ ν ἐ φ ’ ἡ μ ῖ ν κ α ὶ δ ι ’ ἡ μ ῶ ν δ υ ν α μ έ ν ω ν γ ε ν έ σ θ α ι κ α ὶ ἄ δ η λ ο ν ἐ χ ό ν τ ω ν τ ὸ τ έ λ ο ς, τ ο υ τ έ σ τ ι δ υ ν α μ έ ν ω ν κ α ὶ ο ὕ τ ω κ α ὶ ἄ λ λ ω ς γ ε ν έ σ θ α ι. τ ὸ μ ὲ ν ο ὖ ν ‘ἐ φ ’ ἡ μ ῖ ν ’ ε ἴ ρ η τ α ι, ἐ π ε ι δ ὴ π ε ρ ὶ τ ῶ ν π ρ α κ τ ῶ ν μ ό ν ο ν β ο υ λ ε υ ό μ ε θ α (τ α ῦ τ α γ ὰ ρ ἐ φ ’ ἡ μ ῖ ν)...

[17] Benevich Grigory

Russian Christian Humanitarian Academy, St. Petersburg, Russian Federation